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DISCLOSURE IN A POST-CITIZENS UNITED

REAL WORLD
BY
BRADLEY A. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
That wealthy individuals, corporations and unions, or well-funded
associations of people should make large contributions to parties and
candidates, and that expenses in political races are not legally restricted, is
unpopular with a significant majority of Americans.' At the same time,
most legal thinkers acknowledge that campaign finance laws raise serious
questions about free speech that must be analyzed under First Amendment
doctrine.2 Because it takes money to widely propagate almost any political
point of view and to reach substantial numbers of voters, or to organize and
maintain the infrastructure of a campaign for office, restrictions on
contributions to candidates, parties, and political committees, and
limitations on expenditures for political purposes, seriously threaten rights
to speech and association.' Indeed, while substantial majorities favor
limiting contributions and expenditures, there is also broad public support
for political spending as a form of free speech.'
Former House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt may have captured
the perceived dilemma when he stated, "What we have is two important
* Josiah H. Blackmore II/Shirley M. Nault Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.
Former Chairman, Federal Election Commission. I thank the Journal of Law and Public Policy at
the University of St. Thomas School of Law for sponsoring this symposium.
1. See Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign
Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 133,
139-141 (2004); Lydia Saad, Public Agrees With Court: Campaign Money is "Free Speech",

GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125333/public-agrees-court-campaignmoney-free-speech.aspx.
2. Since Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), twenty justices have sat on the Supreme
Court, and all save Justices Stevens and White have agreed that the issue is one that should be
analyzed as a First Amendment question.
3. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 ("significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of
the sort that compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some
legitimate governmental interest.").
4. Saad, supra note 1.
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values in direct conflict: freedom of speech and our desire for healthy
campaigns in a healthy democracy."5 The intensity of this conflict is
underscored by the length of the Court's campaign finance opinionsBuckley v. Valeo' and McConnell v. FederalElection Commission' are two
of the longest reported cases in the Court's history.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,' which struck down
laws prohibiting corporations (and by implication unions) from making
independent expenditures in political races, is not one of the longer
campaign finance cases, even with Justice Stevens' rambling, ninety-plus
page dissent. Arguably, it is far from the most important in its practical
ramifications.' But Citizens United is almost certainly the most hotly
debated of the Court's campaign finance decisions. More than in Buckley,
Bellotti,'o Austin," McConnell, or any of the Court's prior decisions, there is
little room for compromise in Citizens United. The Court majority has been
criticized for "reaching out" to address an issue not squarely presented in
the lower court or in the petition for certiorari.12 The opinion is absolutist in
tone, stating that, at least for purposes of constitutional review, independent
expenditures can never create the type of corruption sufficient to justify
government intrusions on the rights of speakers. For its part, the dissent is
equally or even more absolutist. Rather than concur in the judgment on any
of the grounds suggested in the majority opinion, the dissenters stake out as
5. George Will, Editorial, Fending off the Speech Police, WASH. POST, March 11, 2001
(quoting Richard Gephardt). Gephardt has been criticized for this statement, including by this
author, see Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform's War on PoliticalFreedom, CITY J.

(July 1, 2007), available at http://www.city-joumal.org/html/ws2007-07-Olbs.html), but the
statement is reflective of much thinking on the subject and perhaps, on further reflection, not so
far off the mark.
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
8. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
9. See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance
After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 646 (2011) ("Citizens United is

unlikely to 'unleash' corporate campaign spending"); Keith E. Hamm et al., The Impact of
Citizens United in the States: Independent Spending in State Elections, 2006-2010 (Oct. 22, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/State-Indep-Spdg_200610_Working-Paper-as-Released-220ctober2Ol2.pdf.
Certainly Buckley outranks Citizens United in the hierarchy of campaign finance decisions, but
even several Court of Appeals decisions, such as SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599
F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (allowing pooling of unlimited contributions for independent
expenditures, thus creating "Super PACS") and Fed. Election Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax
Reform Immediately Committee, 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (reinforcing Buckley's narrow
definition of political communications covered by the Federal Election Campaign Act) have had
greater practical effect than Citizens United, even though the legal theories of Citizens United can
be viewed as far more reaching.
10. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
11. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
12.

See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts

Court, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 206-213 (2009).
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radical a position in favor of government regulation as one can imagine. In
essence, the dissent argues that the government can censor, even ban, the
distribution of a documentary movie about an issue of vital public
importance solely because the movie is-like virtually all films-produced
or distributed by a corporation."
Lillian BeVier, in an article written before Citizens United, neatly
summarized the gulf separating the two sides:
[O]ne finds the justices talking past one another. They share neither
empirical assumptions nor theoretical premises. For the
majority ... freedom to spend money on political speechincluding freedom of corporations to spend money on political
speech about issues-is the answer. . . The dissenters take an

utterly opposing view. From their perspective, corporate and union
freedom to spend money on political speech is the problem.
(emphasis in original). 4
Yet as the two sides have gazed at each other across this divide, there
has been one area of reasonably broad agreement-disclosure of campaign
contributions and spending. In Citizens United, eight justices voted to
uphold the disclosure requirements of the law."
Not surprisingly the primary political reaction to Citizens United has
been a demand for new laws and regulations governing the disclosure of
political spending and contributions.' 6 In this paper, I am going to suggest
that proposed new regulations have tended to overlook some serious
practical problems of increased compulsory disclosure; that the effort to
mandate increased disclosure is, at least in substantial measure, based on
illegitimate intent and an incorrect understanding of the extent of
compulsory disclosure laws both before and after Citizens United; and that
13. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
14. Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 2006-07, Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 106-07 (2007).

15.

130 S. Ct. at 913-916. Justice Thomas dissented on this point. 130 S. Ct. at 980-982

(Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. Beyond disclosure, Citizens United has been used as a rallying cry to try to raise support
for tax-funded political campaigns, see, e.g., Adam Skaggs & Fred Wertheimer, Empowering
Small Donors in Federal Elections, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://brennan.3cdn.net/b7lblef639lb3a4813_5jm6bwz6j.pdf, and has sparked efforts to create
various constitutional amendments to overturn the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, see
Ramsey Cox, Sanders Applauds Obama's Support for Citizens United Amendment, THE HILL
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/246979-sanders-applauds-obamassupport-for-an-amendment-to-the-citizen-united-decision, or even to debate the two-century old
doctrine of "corporate personhood." See Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United, Corporate
Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension Between Constitutional Law and Corporate
Law, ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2013).
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the new disclosure sought threatens hard won constitutional rights that we
ought not surrender easily. I conclude that compulsory disclosure cannot
bear the weight some now seek to place upon it, and that in trying we may
endanger other important values. These portions constitute Parts III and IV,
respectively, of this paper. I start in Parts I and II, however, with a review
of campaign finance disclosure laws pre- and post-Citizens United."
I.

THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE PRE-

CITIZEN'S UNITED

Disclosure, or "publicity" as it was once called, has been at the core of
campaign finance law since the practice of regulating political campaigns
began in the early twentieth century." The first federal publicity law was
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910,19 and by the time Citizens United
was decided in 2010, forty-nine states and the federal government required
some degree of disclosure of campaign contributions and spending.20
Citizens United neither made nor required changes to campaign
disclosure laws. Nor have disclosure provisions been upended in any of the
Roberts' Court's other decisions." Similarly, in SpeechNow.org v. Federal
Election Commission, the D.C. Court of Appeals decision that gave the
green light to so-called Super PACs, the Court upheld the challenged
disclosure provisions and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.22
In light of this, the casual observer could be excused for wondering
about all the rhetoric regarding disclosure of campaign spending and
contributions that has followed Citizens United. On July 22, 2012, this
author entered "citizens united secret money" into the Google search
engine, and returned "about 5,710,000 results." The first three hits, in the
small teasers to the entries, noted (1) "Secret corporate money continues to
swamp the American political process... wake of the 2010 U.S. Supreme
Court ruling in Citizens United" (2) "Credit the Supreme Court's grotesque

17. Although Citizens United is the decisive case in the public mind, the U.S. Court of
Appeals decision in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.
2010), decided just a few weeks later, is perhaps equally important to the discussion. I will
continue to use "Citizens United" as convenient shorthand for the break that occurred in the late
winter of 2010.
18. See, e.g. PAULA BAKER, CURBING CAMPAIGN CASH: HENRY FORD, TRUMAN
NEWBERRY, AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRESSIVE REFORM 59-61 (2012).
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910).
The lone holdout was North Dakota, a state not generally known for its political
corruption. THE CAL. VOTER FOUND., THE CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, & UCLA
SCHOOL OF LAW, Grading State Disclosure 2008 (2008), http://campaigndisclosure.org/
19.
20.

gradingstate/ GSDO8.pdf.
21.

Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right To Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). See 72 Fed. Reg.

72899, 72910-12 (Dec. 26, 2007) (Federal Election Commission Revisions to 11 C.F.R. § 114
after Wisconsin Right to Life decision).

22.

SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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decision in Citizens United vs. the Federal.. .a record amount of secret
money flooding our democracy," and (3) "'This flood of secret money
unleashed by Citizens United is drowning out the voices of middle-class
Americans,' [Sen.] Whitehouse added."23 Such entries go on for page after
page.
To understand the apparent disconnect between the sudden concern
about "secret money" in politics and its relation to a series of cases that did
not change the laws governing campaign disclosure, during a time in which
neither Congress nor the Federal Election Commission made changes in the
rules governing disclosure, we will take a brief tour through the realm of
disclosure as it existed at the time of Citizens United. We will start that
discussion by briefly reviewing the legal framework in place at the start of
January 2010, when Citizens United was decided.
Though battles over limitations and prohibitions on contributions and
expenditures have tended to dominate political and legal debate (at least
until Citizens United), disclosure of campaign contributions and spending
has never been an easy issue for the Supreme Court. As is so common in
the world of campaign finance, our discussion begins with the seminal case
of Buckley v. Valeo. 24 In Buckley, the Court for the first time faced a First
Amendment challenge to campaign disclosure laws. The Court began by
recognizing compulsory disclosure as a First Amendment issue that "in
itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief' and
holding that government mandated disclosure must be subject to "exacting
scrutiny," requiring more than "some legitimate governmental interest. "25
The Court recognized three governmental interests of sufficient
"magnitude" for disclosure of contributions and expenditures to survive

23.

These synopses come from links to, respectively: (1) Michael Kirkland, Under the U.S.

Supreme Court: Citizens United -

My how the money rolls in, UPI (July 15,

2012),

http://www.upi.com/TopNews/US/2012/07/15/Under-the-US-Supreme-Court-Citizens-UnitedMy-how-the-money-rolls-in/UPI-35041342337400/; (2) Robert Reich, The Secret Big-Money
Takeover of America, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-

reich/the-secret-bigmoney-takeob_754938.html; and (3) Eric W. Dolan, Sen. Whitehouse: Secret
money drowning out voices of the middle-class, THE

RAW STORY (July

15,

2012),

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/07/15/sen-whitehouse-secret-money-drowning-out-voices-ofthe-middle-class/. In each case, the text reflects the synopses as they appeared on my Google
screen on that date, including the ellipses in the first two quotes. A July 23, 2012 search of the
Lexis news database for the two years from July 23, 2010 through July 22, 2012 yielded 490
stories using the terms "Citizens United" and "secret money." A search using just the term "secret
money" for the two years immediately preceding Citizens United yielded only 269 hits, of which
only 14 used the term in connection with U.S. politics, and five of those 14 did so only because
the byline went to reporters for National Public Radio's "Secret Money Project."
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a brief overview of the early disclosure laws, see Buckley, 424
U.S. at 61-62. More detail appears in Allison R. Hayward, Revisiting the Fable of Reform, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421, 428-441 (2008); see generally ROBERT MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS,
CONGRESSES AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (1988).

25.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (citations omitted).
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such "exacting scrutiny." "First, disclosure provides the electorate with
information" that assists voters in "plac[ing] each candidate in the political
spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party
labels and campaign speeches [and]. . . alert[ing] the voter to the interests to
which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate
predictions of future performance in office."26 Second, disclosure can deter
"corruption" or the "appearance of corruption" by allowing the public to
"detect any post-election special favors that may be given in return."27 And
third, disclosure would provide information useful to the government in
enforcing the restrictions on contributions that the Court upheld.28
But the Court nonetheless substantially trimmed back the Federal
Election Campaign Act's ("FECA") disclosure provisions on First
Amendment grounds. The Court recognized that compulsory disclosure
could have a chilling effect on political speech.29 The original language of
the FECA required registration and reporting as a political committee by
any group that made expenditures or contributions "for the purpose of
influencing" a candidate election.30 The Court was concerned that this
would reach groups involved "purely in issue discussion," where the
government's interest was less compelling.' Compulsory disclosure of
funding for issue speech would not address any of the three government
concerns the Court had identified as being of a sufficient magnitude to
overcome the First Amendment hurdles. 32
Thus, to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth, the Court
clearly rejected the idea that disclosure is always constitutional, and
narrowly construed what would count as candidate or election-related
speech that could trigger political committee status and reporting of all
contributions and expenditures. It construed the compulsory disclosure of
donors and members to reach "only. . .organizations that are under the
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election of a candidate," or "funds used for communications that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."33 The
definition of "expressly advocate," in turn, was related back to footnote 52
of the opinion, which narrowly construed the phrase to "communications
containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote
for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote

26.
27.

Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67.

28.

Id. at 67-68.

29.
30.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 145.

31.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.

32.
33.

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 79-80.
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against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' 34
Within the Buckley framework, groups could be forced to disclose
members and donors only to the extent they qualified as "political
committees," which meant that they had a primary purpose of electing
candidates, 35 or that they spent money to finance communications within
the narrow framework of Buckley's footnote 52. To put it in an affirmative
format, at the federal level, all political action committees ("PACs"),
campaign committees, and political parties were required to disclose all of
their donors over the federal aggregate threshold of $200, and other groups
would do so to the extent that they accepted contributions and made
expenditures for communications including "express advocacy."36 Not
disclosed, however, were all of the funders of what came to be known as
"issue ads," political advertisements that discussed candidates and issues
but stopped short of express advocacy. Initially, this seemed to matter
relatively little. Through the 1980s and early 1990s the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") and various political speakers waged a running fire
fight in the federal courts over what constituted "express advocacy," with
the FEC getting the worst of it, but the stakes seemed to be less about
disclosure and much more about whether the spenders could accept
contributions outside the limits and source prohibitions of FECA to run
those ads." Because groups which did not have a major purpose of
candidate advocacy rarely accepted money for the purpose of making
"express advocacy" independent expenditures-most, in fact, were barred
from doing so because they were organized as non-profit corporations and
thus precluded from "express advocacy" by the corporate spending ban of 2
U.S.C. 44lb-they rarely had to disclose information on donors and
members.
As campaign costs rose faster than inflation, however, contribution
limits remained unadjusted for inflation, such that the maximum legal
contributions shrank to a fraction of their original amount in actual

34. Id. at 44 n. 52, 80 n. 108.
35. Political party committees, candidate committees, and registered political action
committees were assumed to meet this criterion, and thus were required to disclose all donors;
whether other groups were determined to be political committees would in turn depend on their
spending for express advocacy political communications. What constitutes a "primary purpose"
has never been fully determined. It is more than identifying candidates as aligned to specific
issues, see Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986), and has
often been tied in with spending a threshold percentage of an organization's total budget, although
not definitively, see Akins v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 101 F.3d 731, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).

36. Since almost every state passed comprehensive disclosure laws within a few years of
Buckley, state regimes were essentially similar except for the dollar amount that triggered
registration and disclosure.
37. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, I10 F.3d 1049, 1055 (1997) and
cases cited therein.
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purchasing power." As a result, political candidates, fundraisers,
consultants, and donors all looked for additional sources of funds to
adequately finance campaigns.3 9 Issue ads run by groups that were not
political committees were a logical solution, because, per Buckley, they
could be run with money raised outside the limits and prohibitions of
FECA. That donors to organizations running such ads could remain
anonymous was mere sprinkles on the donut.
Thus, by the 2000 campaign, issue ads were growing rapidly as a
percentage of total campaign spending. When carefully constructed, their
effect on voters was little different from that of a traditional political ad. For
example, in 2000, the NAACP Voter Action Fund, a nonprofit social
welfare group organized under Section 501(c)(4) of the tax code, ran the
following ad:
Renee Mullins (voice over): I'm Renee Mullins, James Byrd's
daughter. On June 7, 1998 in Texas my father was killed. He was
beaten, chained, and then dragged 3 miles to his death, all because
he was black. So when Governor George W. Bush refused to
support hate-crime legislation, it was like my father was killed all
over again. Call Governor George W. Bush and tell him to support
hate-crime legislation. We won't be dragged away from our
future.4 0
This thirty-second TV spot, featuring graphic reenactment footage,
began running on October 25, 2000, just a few days before the 2000
presidential election.4 1
These types of issue ads were generally run by three types of groups:
(1) nonprofit welfare organizations and trade associations organized under
Section 501(c)(4) and (c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, (2) unions; and
(3) political organizations under Section 527 of the Code that, because they
did not make contributions to candidates or parties, or finance express
38. 1used the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI inflation Calculator (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
http://www.bls.gov/datalinflationcalculator.htm/. By 1996, the maximum legal contribution to a
national political party, $20,000, had a purchasing power barely one-third of what it had when
enacted in 1974-it was the equivalent of $7,253 in 1974. Similarly, by 1996 the value of a
maximum individual contribution to a campaign committee, $1,000, would have been just $363 in
1976.
39. See Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 To Design a New Campaign
Finance Vehicle, 86 TAX NOTES 387 (2000).

40. Byrd Vote-TV, (Oct. 25, 2000) http://www.gwu.edu/-action/ads2/adnaacp.html.
41. Id. For numerous other examples, see generally Taylor Lincoln et al., The New Stealth
PACs: Tracking 501(c) Non-Profit Groups Active in Elections, PUBLIC CITIZEN (2004) available
at http://www.stealthpacs.org/notebook/, and David B. Magleby, Interest-Group Election Ads,
OUTSIDE MONEY:

SOFT MONEY AND

ISSUE ADVOCACY

ELECTIONS 41-62 (David B. Magleby ed., 2000).

IN THE 1998

CONGRESSIONAL
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advocacy communications, did not qualify as "political committees" under
the FECA.42
While this activity was often described as a "loophole" in the law,43 it
should be noted that the use of issue ads in this manner was predicted by the
Buckley Court. In fact, one reason that the Court struck down FECA's
limitations on independent expenditures was that:
[s]o long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote
the candidate and his views. The exacting interpretation of the
statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness
thus undermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing
provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert
improper influence upon a candidate or officeholder. It would
naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons
and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would
have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the
restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but
nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign."
In 2000, Congress passed legislation requiring groups organized under
Section 527 to disclose the names of general donors to the Internal Revenue
Service, unless they were already required to report to the FEC or to state
officials.4 5 In other words, because the Buckley Court had held that express
advocacy was the trigger for compulsory disclosure under FECA, Congress
used the tax code to attempt to achieve greater disclosure of issue ads.
Groups organized under Section 527 but not subject to state or FEC
disclosure as political committees were required to either report donors to
the IRS, where they would be made public, or to pay a tax on income not so
reported.46 The disclosure regime was considerably less thorough than that
required of political committees under FECA, but the core disclosure of
donors was achieved. However, groups operating under Section 501(c)(4)
42. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(2002) (defining political committee), with 2 U.S.C. §
431(9)(B)(2002) (defining expenditure).
43. E.g., Wilson Huhn, Citizens United v. F.E.C. (Part 2): The History of the
Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws, Akron Law Caf6 (Feb. 8, 2010), available at

http://www.ohioverticals.com/blogs/akron law_cafe/2010/02/citizens-united-v-f-e-c-part-2-thehistory-of-the-constitutionality-of-campaign-finance-laws/.
44. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
45. 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2006).
46. The Court has given more leeway to the IRS than to the FEC to define political activity
broadly, given that tax status is not a constitutional right. See Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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of the Code remained free of reporting obligations with respect to their
issue ads.
In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200247 (commonly known as
"BCRA" or "McCain-Feingold" for its lead Senate sponsors), Congress
sought to bring more issue ads into the orbit of campaign finance law.
Section 201 of BCRA defined "electioneering communications" as
broadcast ads costing at least $10,000 and mentioning a candidate within
thirty days of a primary election or sixty days of a general election.
Corporate or union funding for such ads was prohibited, and the law
imposed added reporting requirements on organizations paying for such
ads, including donor information on persons who contributed to the special
accounts that the law required be established to pay for these
"electioneering communications." Both the prohibitions on funding and the
disclosure provisions of Section 201 of BCRA were distinguished from the
FECA provisions at issue in Buckley and upheld in McConnell.4 8
Thus, on the eve of Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, the federal

disclosure regime looked like this:
*
*

*
*
*

All federal candidate committees were required to disclose all
donors and expenditures over $200 to the FEC.49
National political parties and state and local parties engaging in
$1,000 or more of federal activity were required to disclose all
donors and expenditures in excess of $200 to the FEC. 0
All federal PACs were required to disclose donors and expenditures
in excess of $200 to the FEC.
527s that avoided political committee status by avoiding express
advocacy were required to disclose donors over $ 200 to the IRS.52
Any group running "electioneering communications" was required
to disclose data on those expenses, including information on any
person who contributed in excess of $10,000 for those ads, to the

FEC. 53
*

Any person making independent expenditures (that is, ads including

47. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155 (2002) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 434 (2007)).
48. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). In Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) ("WRTL II") the Supreme Court substantially narrowed
the scope of the provisions limiting funding for issue ads, but it did not restrict or constrain the
disclosure provisions in any way. See 72 Fed. Regis. 72899, 72910-12, Dec. 26, 2007 (Federal
Election Commission Revisions to 11 C.F.R. § 114).
49. 2 U.S.C.S. § 434(b) (LexisNexis 2009).
50.
51.

Id.
Id.

52.
53.

26 U.S.C.S. § 527(j)(3)(B) (LexisNexis 2009).
2 U.S.C.S. § 434(f)(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
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"express advocacy") in excess of $250 was required to report to the
FEC.54
Exempt from compulsory reporting and disclosure of donors was
spending by organizations organized under Section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code for issue ads that did not constitute "electioneering
communications" because they were run outside the thirty and sixty day
pre-election windows of BCRA." However, even these ads-like all of the
political ads-were required to include within the framework of the ad the
name of the group that was paying for the ad (though not the name of
donors to the organization).5
II.

THE EFFECT OF CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW.ORG ON
DISCLOSURE

Citizens United and SpeechNow.org substantially altered the campaign

finance landscape. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court ruled that
corporations, and by implication unions, could make independent
expenditures in political races. In SpeechNow.org, the Court of the Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, in a unanimous en banc decision that was not appealed
by the FEC, ruled that PACs that only made independent expendituresthat is, that did not make contributions to candidates or parties or work in
coordination with candidates or parties-could accept contributions without
limit and were not subject to the source prohibitions of the FECA. Although
SpeechNow.org was itself an unincorporated entity and did not intend to
accept corporate funds, when combined with Citizens United the
SpeechNow.org decision made clear that corporations, unions, and
individuals could pool unlimited sums for independent expenditures,
creating what became known colloquially as "Super PACs.""
54. 2 U.S.C.S. §434(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
55. Prior to Citizens United, most 501(c) organizations could not run "independent
expenditures"-that is, express advocacy ads-because they were incorporated and therefore
barred from doing so. A few nonprofits were able to make independent expenditures under a
judicially created exemption for ideological nonprofits that relied on individual donations, see
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). These incorporated
nonprofits were required to file reports with the FEC listing their independent expenditures and
the names of donors who contributed for the purpose of making those expenditures.
56. The FCC requires a sponsorship identification on broadcast television at 47 C.F.R. §
73.1212 (2012) and on cable television at 47 C.F.R. § 76.1615 (2006). For FEC rules mandating
reporting and disclosure, see 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 (2002), 432 (2004), 434 (2007), 438 (1995), 439
(2002), 441(repealed); see also 36 U.S.C. § 510 (2002); and 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.1 to 104.22 (2006).
Because most states have adopted similar rules to those of the FECA and BCRA, state disclosure
rules are not substantially different, except that the thresholds for reporting are often lower and
occasionally higher.
57. This name appears to have originated with the pro-"reform" journalist Eliza Newlin
Carney. See Eliza Newlin Carney, Labor's Uphill Climb This Year, National Journal (June 25,

2010), available at http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.stthomas.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA22990
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While neither Citizens United nor SpeechNow.org altered the statutory
disclosure system, they altered the rules against which disclosure took place
by allowing corporate contributions to organizations that made independent
expenditures and electioneering communications. Some have argued that
this new background allows "secret money" into elections.
The argument that Citizens United (and SpeechNow.org) have enabled
"secret money" to enter campaigns goes like this: incorporated 501(c)(4)
and 501(c)(6) organizations can now make independent expenditures and
electioneering communications about candidates. While the nonprofits will
have to file the appropriate reports about their expenditures with the FEC,
unless money is given specifically to run the ads in question, the donors to
these non-profits will not be disclosed. Further, while so-called Super PACs
are treated just as traditional PACs, and are required to register and report
all donors over $200 to the FEC, those donors can include non-profit
corporations. Thus, while the Super PAC will file with the FEC and will
report that XYZ Nonprofit Corporation contributed to the Super PAC,
donors to XYZ will not be disclosed.
Let us begin by noting that terms such as "secret" and "undisclosed" are
somewhat out of place in discussing these donations to 501(c)(4) and (c)(6)
organizations. Through the independent expenditure and electioneering
communication reports filed with the FEC, the names of the sponsoring
organizations that appear on the ads themselves, and the political files that
must be maintained by broadcasters," observers do know who has paid, at
least nominally, for all these ads.
Of course, we do not necessarily know all that some observers would
like to know-most importantly, who is supporting the advertiser with
general contributions. But then again, that was true before Citizens United.
When non-profits ran ads such as the NAACP Voter Education Fund James
Byrd ad," observers did not necessarily know who was contributing to the
non-profit.
Moreover, even donors to traditional PACs, parties, and candidate
committees are not required to reveal their sources of income. Yes, the law
does require such committees to ask about employers, but it does not
require donors to disclose those employers to the committees, nor to reveal
other sources of income that may have financed the contribution.60 But this
7911&v-2.1& u-clic stthomas&it-r&p=1TOF&sww.
58. 47 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2002), 47 C.F.R. § 73.1943 (2012). In 2012, the Federal
Communications Commission required these files to be available on the internet for most network
affiliates. See Second Report & Order, In the Matter of Standardized and Enhanced Disclosure
Requirements for Television Broadcast Licensee Public Interest Obligations, etc., MM Dkt. Nos.

00-168 & 00-44, FCC No. 12-44 (rel. Apr. 27, 2012), 77 Fed. Reg. 27631 (May 11, 2012).
59. Byrd Vote-TV, supra note 40.

60. 2 U.S.C. § 431(13)(A) (2002); but see Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 76 F. 3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The statute does not require political committees to
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has always been true. It may be that this is legitimately a greater concern
when discussing unlimited contributions to the newly created independent
expenditure PACs than when discussing statutorily limited donations to
candidates (a $2,500 limit in 2012) or traditional PACs ($5,000 limit). On
the other hand, the so-called DISCLOSE Act ("Democracy Is Served by
Casting Light on Spending on Elections"), as introduced in 2012, would
have required donors to nonprofits making electioneering communications
or independent expenditures of just $10,000 or more to be disclosed.61 This
is considerably less than the $30,800 that could be given legally by an
individual to a political party without disclosing the original, underlying
source of the income. That income might come from a lobbying contract for
an industry or Indian tribe, from a foreign government for services or
materials rendered, from a casino, or from government grants, yet its
disclosure has not only never been required, it has never been considered a
problem that has attracted the attention of the "reform" community. It may
also be easier to learn about individual donors from other sources than it is
to learn about corporate donors-at least corporations that are not publicly
traded. Given that one reason that the Supreme Court has upheld
compulsory disclosure is to provide the public with voting cues, however,
we should recognize that even if all the voter sees is that the Chamber of
Commerce, the National Resources Defense Council, the National Rifle
Association, or Public Campaign pays for an ad, voters have a pretty solid
cue.
A second reason that the Court has upheld such laws is to assist in
enforcement. But since the FEC has the power to audit or investigate
spenders for violations of the law, including subpoena power, a public
"piercing of the veil" is probably not terribly important for enforcement
purposes. For example, the Internal Revenue Code does not make tax
returns public merely so that curious or vindictive persons, or those who
merely want to make sure that the law is followed, can assist in reporting
possible violations.
It is also doubtful that the law, even after Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org, allows many of the examples that are being attributed to it.
For example, in the spring of 2011, a corporation called W. Spann LLC,
incorporated just six weeks earlier in March 2011, made a $1 million
contribution to Restore Our Future, a Super PAC supporting Republican
presidential candidate Mitt Romney. The company then dissolved in July

report the information for 'each' donor. It only requires committees to use their best efforts to
gather the information and then report to the Commission whatever information donors choose to
provide.") (emphasis in original).
61.

DISCLOSE: The Rise of Secret Money in Campaignsand Elections, Public Citizen (July

24, 2012),
needed.pdf.

available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/rise-of-secret-money-disclosure-
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2011, apparently without having conducted any other business.62 Leaving
aside that within days of Restore Our Future reporting the donation to the
FEC the name of the lawyer who incorporated the firm and the name of the
donor were widely known thanks to a mere modicum of investigative
reporting,63 it should be noted that the contribution was almost certainly an
illegal contribution given in the name of another.'
Similarly, a popular skit by the cable comedian Stephen Colbert
suggested that one could hide his identity by incorporating a company for
the purpose of contributing to Colbert's joke Super PAC, Citizens for a
Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow." The skit made for good comedy. But during
the Question and Answer period of a speech at the American Law Institute,
Colbert's lawyer, former FEC Chairman Trevor Potter, admitted the
scenario he and Colbert had played out on the Comedy Central channel
would in fact violate the requirement that a non-profit have a primary
purpose other than political activity and could be subject to fines by the
IRS."
In fact, Citizens United did not change the de jure disclosure regime,
and had little effect on de facto disclosure. Prior to passage of BCRA,
501(c) non-profits and trade associations could accept unlimited funds from
any source, and pay for issue ads run at any time. Beginning with the 2004
election, when McCain-Feingold took effect, they could accept unlimited
funds from any source, and run such issue ads at any time more than thirty
62.

See Michael Isikoff, Firm Gives $1 million to Pro-Romney Group, then Dissolves,

MSNBC (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44011308/ ns/politics-decision 2012/t/
firm-gives-million-pro-romney-group-then-dissolves/#.UBgxz2glZl.
63.

Daniel Politi, Edward Conrad: Mystery Romney Donor Behind W. Spann LLC Comes

Forward, SLATE (Aug. 6, 2011), http://slatest.slate.com/posts/2011/08/06/edward-conard_
mystery-romney-donor-behind _w_spann_ lic comes forw.html.
64. See 2 U.S.C.S § 441(f) (LexisNexis 2012).
65. See The Colbert Report, COMEDY CENTRAL (television broadcast Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/398531/september-29-201 1/colbertsuper-pac-trevor-potter-stephen-s-shell-corporation.
66. See Webcast: Annual Meeting Minutes, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (May 23, 2012),
http://2012am.ali.org/videos.cfm?videoid=1. This contrasted with Potter's statement during his
set comments that the Colbert skit was "accurate." The "accurate" comment is at approximately
12:30, and the Q & A begins at approximately 41:50. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2008) and 26

C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (1990) regarding rules governing 501(c) organizations and primary
purpose. In another sketch, Colbert and The Daily Show host John Stewart (now operating
Citizens for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow) coordinated their activity over the phone through

nods and other non-verbal cues, though Colbert claimed to be a candidate. Attorney Potter, via
telephone and in an act of borderline legal malpractice, informed them that their activities were
legal, though this required Potter to ignore the non-verbal cues between the parties. In my opinion,
such action constituted illegal coordination. See The Daily Show, COMEDY CENTRAL (television
broadcast Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-january-17-2012/colbert-superpac-not-coordinating-with-stephen-colbert. Perhaps the conflicting views of two former FEC
Commissioners, the pro-"reform" Potter and the pro-speech author, demonstrates the inherent
confusion in the law, in which case modest adjustment to the statutory language, rather than a
major expansion of mandatory disclosure, would probably solve the problem.
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days before a primary or sixty days before a general election without
disclosing their general donors. Since Citizens United, they are able to
accept unlimited funds from any source, and run express advocacy ads at
any time, without disclosing their general donors. Essentially, on the
disclosure front, Citizens United re-establishes the status quo in existence
prior to the election cycle of 2004, with two differences. First, (c)(4) and
(c)(6) non-profits may make expenditures for both issue ads and express
advocacy ads, rather than being limited to issue ads. Given that the FEC had
argued that the difference between such ads was ephemeral-even that issue
ads were a more effective means of campaigning than express advocacy
ads-this probably represents a relatively insignificant change.67 Second,
there actually remains some greater disclosure of these issue ads than there
was prior to the 2004 election cycle, since Citizens United did not repeal
BCRA's disclosure requirements for those ads.
It certainly may be that all 501(c) organizations should have greater
disclosure obligations, and it appears that more money is being spent
through 501(c) organizations in 2010 and 2012 than in past elections, which
might increase the desirability of greater compulsory disclosure. But the
issue is one of degree, not a revolution in disclosure rules suddenly
allowing "secret" money where it did not exist before. This recognition
might make us a bit more skeptical of alarmist cries for new rules. Such
skepticism is useful, because there are many problems with increased
disclosure, both in drafting an effective statute, and in the constitutionality
of the effort.
III.

SOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF ENHANCED COMPULSORY
DISCLOSURE

The argument for added compulsory disclosure is generally framed in
terms of the public's "right to know,"6 8 or sometimes as a desire to find out
who is "really behind"" various ads. Finding out, and then alerting the
67. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 471 (2007) (citing
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 127 (2003)).
68.

See Lisa Rosenberg,

FCC Poised to Take the Lead on Political Advertising

Transparency, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Oct. 27, 2011, 1:16PM), http://sunlightfoundation.
com/blog/2011/10/27/fcc-poised-to-take-the-lead-on-political-advertising-transparency/
("[T]he
public, ... has a right to know who is paying for the avalanche of political ads that will blast from
their televisions in the months ahead.").
69. See The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Weekly Address: President Obama
Castigates GOP Leadershipfor Blocking Fixes for the Citizens United Decision (Sep. 18, 2010)

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/18/weekly-address-presidentobama-castigates-gop-leadership-blocking-fixes ("I warned of the danger posed by a Supreme
Court ruling called Citizens United.... It gave the special interests the power to spend without
limit - and without public disclosure - to run ads in order to influence elections. Now, as an
election approaches, it's not just a theory. We can see for ourselves how destructive to our
democracy this can become. We see it in the flood of deceptive attack ads sponsored by special
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public as to who is "really behind" advertisements, however, is one of those
things that is easier said than done.
Let us start with proposals to include additional information on the face
of the ad itself. The FECA includes a requirement that all political ads
include the name of the sponsor and state whether that sponsor is an
authorized committee of a candidate; if it is not, it must also include the
name and permanent street address, telephone number or web address of the
advertiser, and state that it is not an authorized message of any candidate.70
Additionally, the BCRA added a requirement that candidates seeking to
qualify for preferred advertising rates must include a provision sometimes
dubbed, "stand by your ad," in which the candidate personally appears in
the ad and states that he "approves this message."'
Recent proposals have sought to include more information on the face
of the ad. A model has been California's "top two" rule, which provides
that in initiative and referenda, an ad must include on its face the names of
the two largest financial contributors of $50,000 or more.72 The
requirements do not apply to candidate ads because, presumably, candidates
must already disclose all their donors to the authorities. However, in light of
the ability of nonprofit membership corporations to make express advocacy
communications in a post-Citizens United world, some have argued for the
adoption of such laws in candidate races. Connecticut, in fact, has passed a
statute requiring the top five donors to be listed on the ad.
However, leaving aside the questions of privacy that we will come to
shortly, there are limits on how far this can go. Even the simple disclaimer
required by the FECA takes up roughly ten to fifteen percent of a thirtysecond radio ad, not including a "stand by your ad" disclaimer required of
candidates. It may be suggested that this three to five second
commandeering of speaker airtime is trivial, and at times it may be. But one
can say bold and important things in three to five seconds: "Give me liberty
or give me death;" "My only regret is that I have but one life to give for my
country;" "We have nothing to fear but fear itself;" or, more mundanely,
"The Washington Post's Fact Checker rates these claims 'untrue;"' or "I
interests using front groups with misleading names. We don't know who's behind these ads or
who's paying for them.")
70. 2 U.S.C.S § 441(d) (LexisNexis 2012). Most every state's disclosure rules are similar or
identical. Additionally, the Federal Communications Commission requires television and radio
ads to include the sponsor's name. The rules are relatively lax-a commercial can typically qualify
simply by featuring the product advertised in the ads. It is difficult to envision too many
commercial ads, or political ads, that would not want to include such information. See 47 C.F.R. §
73.1212 (2012).
71. 2 U.S.C.S § 441(d) (LexisNexis 2012). The statute also provides that a "clearly
identifiable" photo may be used as a substitute for a personal appearance.
72. Cal. Gov't § 84503 (West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code 2012).
73. 2010 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 10-187, codified as amended at C.G.S.A. § 9-601c (West
2010).
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will never, ever vote to raise your taxes." It is not clear that it is more useful
to candidates or to voters to have the three to five second FECA disclaimer
read instead, and since incumbents tend to benefit from low information
races, there is no reason to think that the rule is benign or even neatly
reflects popular sentiment. In any event, efforts to identify major funders
increasingly eat into campaign time.
For example, in March 2012 the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration held hearings on Senate Bill 2219, the "Democracy Is
Served by Casting Light On Spending in Elections Act," a clumsy name
that nevertheless yielded the propagandistic acronym of the "DISCLOSE
Act." The bill included a provision that would have required a radio ad to
include the following spoken disclaimer:74
Paid for by American Action for the Environment, www dot
American Action for the Environment dot org. Not authorized by
any candidate or candidate's committee. American Action for the
Environment is responsible for the content of this advertising. I am
John Smith, chief executive officer of American Action for the
Environment, and American Action for the Environment approves
this message. Major funders are Ronald B. Coppersmith and
Donald Wasserman Schultz."
Speaking this disclaimer would provide listeners with more information
about funding, but could easily take twenty to twenty-five seconds.
Whether this is the best use of political debate time is certainly an open
question. The disclosure obtained from this lengthy statement is of dubious
value. In terms of helping the viewer know who is "really behind" the ad,
he learns the names of a pair of funders he has likely never heard of or seen
before, and sees the image of a CEO he has probably never heard of
assuring him that the group already identified as paying for the ad in fact
approves of the ad for which it is paying. Of course, there are other
circumstances where the name of the top funders might mean more to the
viewer, and the viewer may be motivated to try to learn more about the
major funders identified in the ad. But these are uncertain benefits, and they
come with potential costs. For example, beyond crowding out a more

74. It remains a curiosity of election law that these types of notices are routinely referred to
as "disclaimers," since they are, if anything, "claimers," that state who paid for the advertisement.
Perhaps it is indicative of the relatively low value of such disclosure that people lump these
notices in with the true disclaimers of commercial advertising-the caveats, conditions and
limitations that are spoken quickly at the end of the typical commercial ad.
75. Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2012:
Hearing on S. 2219 Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 112th Cong. 3 (2012) (statement of

David B. Keating, President, Center for Competitive Politics).
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substantive message, forcing the CEO of the organization paying for the
message to appear may lead viewers to make judgments on the basis of
race, sex, disability, or other characteristics that might best be left off the
table.
Most of the proposals for new mandatory disclosure requirements,
however, deal not with added disclosure on the face of the ad, but with
added reporting of information to government agencies. The goal is to get
behind the name of the nonprofit (c)(4) or (c)(6) group to learn who are the
donors to the organization. It is believed that this will help voters better
judge the ads they are seeing or hearing, and "hold speakers accountable."
Let us leave aside for a moment what it might mean to hold a speaker
"accountable" for lawful, non-defamatory speech, and whether the
government has a compelling-or even non-compelling-interest in forcing
persons to disclose their political activity so that private citizens-or perhaps
merely the government's allies in the mob-may "hold them accountable."
We must consider whether such compulsory disclosure serves that goal.
Disclosure of general financial donors to groups sounds easier in theory
than it is in practice. Consider this scenario: Acme Industries makes a
$100,000 dues payment to the National Business Chamber ("NBC") in
December of an election year, say 2014, and then again in 2015. NBC, in
order to encourage political activity by local and state chambers of
commerce, agrees to match what the State Chamber of Commerce raises for
election activity in the 2016 elections. State Chamber raises $350,000
specifically for political activity over several months, and the National
Chamber matches it by sending a check to State Chamber in March 2016.
In June of 2016, State Chamber transfers $1 million - the $350,000 it raised
specifically for political activity, the $350,000 from the NBC, and another
$300,000 from general dues - to the Committee for a Better State ("CBS"),
a 501 (c)(4) organization that the State Chamber uses for its political
activity. CBS reserves $200,000 for its own direct spending, and then
transfers $800,000 to the State Jobs Alliance, a coalition formed to promote
pro-business issues and candidates, which raises and spends $3 million in
the state, about two-thirds for advertising on a ballot initiative. When NBC,
the State Chamber, CBS, and the State Jobs Alliance file their spending
reports, what donors are to be disclosed, and for how much?
What should be immediately obvious to any observer is that the
question of "disclosure" is not so easy. Is Acme Industries responsible for
spending by NBC, CBS, or the State Chamber? Is there some point at which
Acme becomes cut off from political spending made by entities to which it
neither directly gave money nor directed money, over which it has no
control, and which is made eighteen months or more after Acme's initial
payment to NBC?
This problem, which we might call the Russian Nesting Doll problem,
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after the little Russian dolls of decreasing size, placed one inside the other,76
is a serious one. If we only disclose that the State Jobs Alliance received
money from CBS, we haven't solved the problem of "who is really behind"
the expenditures, at least if, as seems to be essential to the entire
"disclosure" argument, one is unwilling to accept that the State Jobs
Alliance or CBS really is the party behind the expenditures. Going one level
deeper only reveals the State Chamber, still not revealing the original
source of funding. Further on, we find NBC-but where does NBC get its
money? By the time we reach Acme Industries, is the information useful-or
even truthful? Would it be truthful to say that Acme Industries is
"responsible" or "endorses" messages on a state ballot initiative made by
the State Jobs Alliance far down the road?
In the hypothetical above-one based on my real world experience as a
campaign finance lawyer and one which other practicing attorneys will
quickly recognize-there is no particular effort to conceal funding; groups
are simply engaged in political activity in the interest of their members. The
problem, of course, gets more complicated if a donor actually wants to
conceal its identity. One could, for example, require only the disclosure of
donations made within the past year, but the effect would be merely to push
donations back to thirteen months out. One might require that donors be
revealed for some set number of transactions back, but this seems arbitrary
and in any case would be easily skirted by simply creating and inserting
more intermediary organizations into the process.
A law might include a basic accounting norm, for example, LastIn/First-Out (LIFO) or First-In/First-Out (FIFO). Under LIFO, the last
contributors to an organization not previously "disclosed" for another ad
would be listed as paying for the most recent ad. Under FIFO, the most
recent ad would be attributed to the earliest contributors not previously
disclosed. But if the goal is to inform viewers who is really behind an ad,
this seems thoroughly unhelpful, particularly if the group doing the
spending is involved in various causes and races. Acme Industries might be
generally supportive of NBC, but wholly opposed to the particulars or even
the cause and candidates of the ads eventually run by the State Jobs
Alliance. Suppose, for example, that Bob Perry, a Texas home builder well
known for his support of the Republican Party and conservative groups
such as Swift Boat Veterans for Truth,n were to decide that an effective
way to support conservative causes and Republican candidates was to give
to the National Rifle Association ("NRA"). The NRA routinely endorses
incumbents of any party with pro-gun records. Thus, if the NRA endorsed a
76.

I thank Joe Birkenstock for the label.

77.

Ben Smith, Meet Bob Perry, POLITICO (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.politico.com/blogs

/bensmith/1010/MeetBobPerry.html. This example is purely hypothetical, the author having no
knowledge of Mr. Perry's plans or intentions.
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pro-gun rights Democratic incumbent in a gubernatorial race," would it
help or harm voters' knowledge to have Bob Perry identified with NRA
spending in the race?
Few of us identify or endorse everything that a group of which we are a
member or financial supporter chooses to do. Rather, people contribute to
organizations because they believe that, on balance, those oganizations do
some good. But at some point, and sooner rather than later, the effort to
track money back to its source will provide voters with as much
disinformation as information, and will be unfair to speakers and donors as
well.
Efforts at original source reporting are also likely to actually harm
public knowledge of the overall operation of the campaign finance system.
For example, in the above hypothetical, should NBC, CBS, the State
Chamber, and the State Jobs Alliance each report Acme Industries as a
donor? For how much? If each must report upriver donors such as Acme as
donors to their own groups, for the entire amount of Acme's original dues
to NBC, the total reported will vastly overstate both Acme's role, and, as
other donors are treated in the same fashion, total spending in the election
cycle. Allison Hayward has dubbed this type of misleading information
"junk disclosure." 79 There is evidence that over-reporting by the press
already leads Americans to grossly overestimate spending in elections.so
Perhaps these problems could be skirted by demanding detailed
accounting throughout the system. It might start with Acme, which might
be required to earmark all permissible uses of its donation. But this is
unlikely to solve any problem. Surely Acme must be able to mark funds for
"general operations," and once it does that, the entire question is back on
the table. Requiring Acme to explicitly authorize the use of its dues for
political activity doesn't solve the problem either-we would still have the
allocation problem downstream.
Furthermore, at some point the allocation and accounting that reformers
seek would be so burdensome as to become clearly suppressive of speech.
Imagine if a business were required to keep track of how businesses from
whom it purchases, or businesses to whom it sells, spent the money paid or
used the goods received. The accounting burden, if not impossible to meet,
would be near overwhelming.
78. See Philip Klein, NRA Endorses Democratic Gov. Strickland over Kasich, THE
SPECTACLE BLOG, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Jun. 14, 2010, 10:54 AM), http://

spectator.org/ blog/2010/06/14/nra-endorses-democratic-gov-st.
79. Allison Hayward, Junk Disclosure: A Series on Stupid Disclaimers, CENTER FOR
COMPETITIVE POLITICS (Feb. I1, 2011), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2011/02/11/junk-

disclosure-a-series-on-stupid-disclaimers.
80. Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik C. Snowberg, & James M. Snyder, Unrepresentative
Information: The Case of Newspaper Reporting on Campaign Finance, 69 Pub. Op.

(2005).
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In short, the enforcement problems of "original source" reporting are
probably insurmountable. It may be that a law might initially disclose some
donor sources that would not have been disclosed before the law took
effect; but once the law is known and understood, it will not be difficult to
work around through the creation or use of other intermediaries. The
solution would appear to give voters bad information-hardly a government
interest and hardly a way to combat corruption or help voters judge a
message.
Simply put, there are limits to the ability of any disclosure regime to
accurately account for the original source of all politically oriented
expenditures. Calling disclosed expenditures "secret money" or "dark
money" is no help in confronting these issues or analyzing the problem.
IV.

SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH ENHANCED
COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE

Anonymous political speech is not an abnormality in American politics,
but has a long, celebrated pedigree. The Federalist Papers, of course, were
published anonymously, but they are hardly the only example of prominent,
anonymous speech from the nation's early history. Indeed, much of the
commentary on adoption of the Constitution was conducted anonymously,
including influential tracts by such anti-federalist writers as Richard Henry
Lee and Robert Yates, writing under pseudonyms such as "Brutus," "The
Federal Farmer," and "Candidus.""' Many prominent Americans have used
anonymous speech or financing of anonymous speech to advance their
political goals, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson,82 Chief
Justice John Marshall,83 Abraham Lincoln,84 and John Hay" to name just a
few.
It is suggested that these examples are inapposite because they do not
go to the question of speech in candidate elections, and do not always
include a financing element.86 But the point here is simply to note that
81.
See generally HERBERT J. STORING WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MURRAY DRY, THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (1981).

82. Beyond Madison's anonymous contributions to the Federalist Papers, Madison and
Jefferson arranged behind-the-scenes financing, and, at least in Madison's case, periodically wrote
anonymous columns for Philip Freneau's National Gazette. See KEVIN R.C. GUTZMAN, JAMES
MADISON AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 262-63 (2012).

83.

Martin S. Flaherty, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and "We the People":

Revisions in Need of Revising, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1370 (2002).
84. See Michael Burlingame, Author Interview, Abraham Lincoln: A Life, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ONLINE (Dec. 2008), http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/books/burlingame.
htm.
85. MICHAEL BURLINGAME, LINCOLN'S JOURNALIST: JOHN HAY'S ANONYMOUS WRITINGS
FOR THE PRESS, 1860-1864 (1998).
86. For example, while the authors of the Federalist Papers were long unknown, the identity

of the publisher was well known.
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Americans have long valued anonymity in public life.
To say that the public has "a right to know" is to beg the question: what
does it have a right to know? And, correspondingly, what do individuals
have a right to keep from the public, or at least not to be forced to disclose
to their neighbors and strangers under the threat of legal sanction? The
Supreme Court has long recognized that anonymity in funding and in
person can be vital to maintaining the speech, associative, and other rights
of citizens. In some cases, the desire for anonymity is based on more
immediate, less abstract considerations. For example, speakers may be
alarmed at having their private addresses and employment information
made available to the public for fear of personal safety or harassment
unrelated to their speech." They may be concerned about retaliation for
their speech from private individuals" or government actors."
Over the years, the Supreme Court has recognized many of these
concerns as not only valid, but of a constitutional dimension. In Thomas v.
Collins,"o a case concerning a requirement for prior registration of speakers,
the Court made clear that there was a presumption of liberty with regard to
the right to speak. The state would have to justify incursions on the right,
not the other way around.91 In the 1950s and 1960s, the Court made a series
of rulings upholding the rights of civil rights organizations to maintain the
confidentiality of their members' and donors' identities, even after the
fact.92 For example, in NAACP v. Alabama, Alabama sought to use the
NAACP's failure to comply with the state's corporation laws to obtain (and
implicitly, to publicize) information on the organization's donors and
members." Said the Court, "[i]t is hardly a novel perception that compelled
disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute
[an] effective restraint on freedom of association," likening such disclosure
to a "requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political
parties wear identifying armbands."94

87.

See Gigi Brienza, Editorial, I Got Inspired. I Gave. I Got Scared, WASH. POST, July 1,

2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/29/AR2007062902
4.html.
88.

2

6

See Bradley A. Smith, In Defense of PoliticalAnonymity, 20 CITY J. 74, 77 (2010).

89. See Kimberly A. Strassel, Editorial, The President Has a List, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26,
2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052702304723304577368280604524916.html.
90. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
91. Id. at 538-39 ("How far the State can require previous identification by one who
undertakes to exercise the rights secured by the First Amendment has been largely
undetermined ... [A] requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem
generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly.").
92. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
93. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
94. Id. at 462.
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Through the "red scare" of the 1950s and the civil rights movement of
the 1950s and 1960s, laws and other government actions aimed at chilling
thought and speech through compelled disclosure were a regular part of the
Court's docket, including United States v. Rumely, prohibiting a
congressional committee from demanding information on customers who
bought political books,95 and Talley v. California, striking down a statute
requiring that handbills urging a business boycott include the identity of the
publisher of the names of those "causing" the handbill to be published."6
These cases did not only involve civil rights organizations. The Court was
even faced with partisan efforts to silence, through the private intimidation
that could be created by compulsory disclosure, the Republican Party in
areas where it was a distinct minority."
During the same period, the Court rejected the idea that anonymous
speech and association were absolute rights. 98 But it had clearly placed the
burden on government to demonstrate that the information sought was
necessary to a "sufficiently important" governmental interest.99 These were
hard-won victories for the principles of free speech and association, but
victories they were.
By the time Buckley was decided in 1976, the Court noted that:
compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment. . . significant
encroachments
on
First
Amendment rights or the sort that compelled disclosure
imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some
legitimate governmental interest. "
Buckley went on to hold that not merely government retaliation, but
private action that was "an unintended but inevitable result of the
government's conduct," was sufficient to demand "exacting scrutiny" of
compulsory disclosure laws.'o1
As a result, we have seen Buckley substantially restrict the reach of the
disclosure provisions of the FECA. Later cases provided still more
protection to anonymous political speech. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
95. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
96. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The handbill in question was aimed at an employer allegedly
engaging in racially discriminatory hiring practices.
97. Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E. D. Ark. 1968), aff'd 393 U.S. 14 (1968) (per
curiam) (State prosecutor sought to subpoena bank records in order to reveal amounts given by
and names of Republican Party donors.).
98. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
99. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
100. Id. at 64.
101. Id.at65
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Campaign Committeel02 upheld the rights of an unpopular minority party to
keep the names of its members, donors, and vendees private in order to
avoid both "governmental and private hostility.""o3 In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission,"10 the Court struck down an Ohio statute requiring
political handbills advocating the passage or defeat of a school tax to
disclose on the handbill the names of those "responsible therefor."
Over a lengthy, fifty-year battle, from Thomas v. Collins through
McIntyre, the Supreme Court established a broad right to privacy in
speaking out on and otherwise holding or supporting one's political views.
This presumptive right of privacy might be overcome where the
governmental interest was particularly strong-as when the "free
functioning of our national institutions" is involved 1os-but even that
obviously compelling interest was interpreted narrowly, applied in a strict
fashion requiring an actual rather than a conjectural threat,o' or where a
donor directly gave a large sum to a candidate or candidate committee or
specifically to support the election or defeat of a candidate.
There are many legitimate reasons why persons might seek to retain
some degree of anonymity while supporting political candidates. For some,
it is an abstract commitment to personal privacy, or a simple desire to shun
the limelight. Others want to avoid being solicited by other worthy (and
unworthy) candidates and causes, a perfectly legitimate desire. Some may
want to avoid awkward personal disclosures.o Anonymous political speech
can also be important for domestic, social, or business peace. Others will be
concerned about the effects that publicizing their political beliefs might
have on career advancement.108
102.

459 U.S. 87 (1982).

103.

Id. at 98-99.

104. 514. U.S. 334 (1995).
105. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
106. Consider that under Brown, a political party whose mission statement called for the
overthrow of the U.S. government was specifically exempted from compulsory disclosure
requirements.
107. Consider, for example, an individual who contributes to a well-known gay rights
advocacy group such as the Human Rights League or the Log Cabin Republicans. Such an
individual may not want these contributions, and the conclusions that others will (rightly or
wrongly) draw from them to be made public. Cf Geoffrey Fowler, When the Most Personal
Secrets Get Outed on Facebook, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 10000872396390444165804578008740578200224.htmi.
108. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). School district could not require all public
school teachers to reveal their membership in groups and associations as a condition of
employment. "[T]o compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that
teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which,
like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.. . . The pressure upon a teacher to avoid
any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny would be constant and
heavy. Public exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school boards to
discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would simply operate to
widen and aggregate the impairment of constitutional liberty." Id. at 485-87. See also Sweezy v.
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Still others will seek anonymity because they wish their arguments to
stand on their own merits, rather than be accepted or rejected based on their
identity, or they may seek to promote ideas that are otherwise unpopular
within their political party or community. In some cases, individuals or
organizations will feel that their message is more effective if it is not
associated with a particular speaker.
The push for additional disclosure now jeopardizes many of these hardwon freedoms. For instance, in Doe v. Reed,'09 the Supreme Court rejected
efforts to keep private the names of signatories to a petition to place a
referendum on same-sex marriage on the Washington state ballot,
dismissing a facial challenge to the law requiring publication but allowing
for an as-applied challenge. The next year, however, the Court rejected that
as-applied challenge."o In the as-applied challenge, the petitioners produced
testimony and evidence that opponents of same-sex marriage were
"'mooned,' 'flipped off,' received angry phone calls, were confronted by
individuals in public places, had pictures taken of them 'postled] to
Facebook,' received vulgar notes, were pushed and yelled at with
explicatives in public, had garbage thrown on them, had their children
threatened, were called 'fascists,' and some even received death threats,""
but this was deemed insufficient to merit relief.
Compare those allegations, however, to the evidence of harassment
presented by the Socialist Workers Party ("SWP") in their 2003 and 2009
requests to extend their exemption from federal reporting standards in
accordance with Brown."l2 In 2009, for example, the SWP evidence of
harassment over a full six year period consisted almost entirely of vague,
general statements of "fear" by SWP supporters, supported by thirteen acts
of vandalism including paint poured over a vehicle, graffiti on campaign
offices, eggs thrown at an office, and "generalized threats of harm to SWP
campaigners.""' The harassment included eleven allegations of
"threatening or hostile statements made by mail or by phone," and four
persons who were terminated from their jobs, though "in three of the
examples, the official basis used by the company to fire the employee was
alleged work-related misconduct and did not pertain to SWP-related

New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (College professor could not be forced to discuss his

knowledge of Communist or Progressive parties as part of state investigation into "subversive
persons" in the state.).
109. John Doe No. I v. Sam Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
110. Doe v. Reed, 132 S. Ct. 449 (2011).
111. Doe v. Reed, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23327, at *8 (Smith, J., dissenting) (9th Cir. Nov.
16, 2011), injunction denied 132 S. Ct. 449 (2011).

112.

The Socialist Workers Party and the FEC have since operated under a settlement which

requires the SWP to seek renewal of its exemption at periodic intervals. See Op. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 2009-01 (Mar. 20, 2009).
113. Op. Fed. Election Comm'n, 2009-01 (Mar. 20, 2009).
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activities."I1 Official harassment allegedly included police ordering
members to remove literature tables blocking public rights of way, FBI
agents questioning a party member who had returned from a trip to Cuba,
and "the possible placement of an SWP activist on a no-fly list. The
individual was permitted to board his flight.""' It seems doubtful that the
exemption for the Socialist Workers or other minority parties or groups can
be sustained on such a record in light of Doe v. Reed.
Compelled political disclosure, has, in recent years, claimed a number
of victims with employment losses. In particular, in the wake of
California's Proposition 8, a measure to bar same-sex marriage in the state,
there were numerous documented instances of vandalism and of persons
losing their jobs after their employers were boycotted, or threatened with
boycotts, because of the employee's financial support or speech for the
measure." 6 If supporters of such measures can be forced to disclose their
associations, in light of legitimate job fears and threats of vandalism, can
we long expect the Court to respect precedents such as Shelton v. Tucker,
holding that teachers cannot be forced to disclose their memberships,"' or
United States v. Rumely, holding that booksellers cannot be forced to reveal
the names of persons buying books in bulk?"' A person buying a political
book in bulk, after all-say Barack Obama's The Audacity of Hope-might
well be planning to distribute those copies in order to assist in the election
or defeat of a candidate. "The public," some would say, "has a right to
know." R.I.P. Runely.
Similarly, in Talley, civil rights protestors were allowed to organize an
economic boycott of employers allegedly engaging in discriminatory hiring
practices, without disclosing their members and financial supporters. Under
the disclosure regime as it appears to exist post-Doe, forced disclosure of an
employee's political donations can lead to a boycott of the employer, but
the boycotters may keep the names of their members and their sources of
financial support anonymous. One doubts that this asymmetry is
sustainable. If it gives, in light of the current passion for "disclosure," it is
114. Id. (In the fourth example, a member was dismissed from employment after taking an
unexcused absence of three weeks to attend a socialist youth conference in Venezuela.).
115. Id. Evidence from the 2003 request, which is similar or even less compelling, is found in
Op. Fed. Election Comm'n. 2003-02 (Apr. 4, 2003) (the author, at the time Vice-Chairman of the
Commission, voted in favor of the SWP's request).
116. See Thomas M. Messner, The Price of Prop 8, HERITAGE FOUNDATION Oct. 22, 2009,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/the-price-of-prop-8. See also Brad Stone, Prop
8 Donor Web Site Shows Disclosure Law is 2-Edged Sword, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2009,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/business/08stream.html?_r-0;

Prop 8 Supporters Suffer

Harassment, Assaults from Homosexual Activists, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 10, 2008,

http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/prop_8_supporters sufferharassmentassaultsfrom_
homosexual-activists/.
117. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
118. U.S. v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
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likely to be the privacy of the boycotters that is lost, not the privacy of the
political donors on all sides that is sustained.
Concurring in Doe v. Reed, Justice Scalia concluded that "[r]equiring
people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage,
without which democracy is doomed."" 9 But in a world in which the
incentive to participate in political debate are already fragile, one has to
question if Justice Scalia does not have the equation backwards.
Consider, for example, the case of Gigi Brienza and other employees of
the pharmaceutical company Bristol Myers Squibb. In the summer of 2006,
Brienza was notified by the company's security department that her name
and home address appeared on a list of "targets" posted online by a radical
animal-rights group called Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty ("SHAC").
SHAC's ultimate target was Huntingdon Life Sciences, a London-based lab
that uses animals in drug safety tests. The FBI has identified SHAC as a
domestic terrorist threat. 20 SHAC members had earlier assaulted a
Huntingdon manager in the United Kingdom with a baseball bat outside his
house, and damaged property and physically threatened scientists in the
United States.' 2 ' Brienza and others were targeted because their employer
did business with Huntingdon. SHAC had learned that Brienza and others
worked for Bristol Myers Squibb through the website of the Federal
Election Commission, which, pursuant to law, publishes the names and
addresses of donors to federal candidates online. Brienza had contributed
$500 to presidential candidate John Edwards in 2004. Using FEC data,
SHAC had published her name and home address, and those of some 100
other Bristol Myers Squibb employees, on the internet under the heading
"now you know where to find them." 22
People such as Brienza will, of course, have no way of knowing in
advance what crazy terrorist group may be interested in their employer. And
if donors such as Brienza are expected to demonstrate "civic courage," one
must consider why the same logic does not apply to donors to the NAACP
and other organizations. The purpose and effect of measures such as the
DISCLOSE Act (were it to pass) is, indeed, to overturn the NAACP v.
Alabama line of cases, requiring disclosure of donors and members should
the organization undertake exactly the type of ads it has in the past.123 As
one original sponsor of DISCLOSE stated when introducing the bill, "the
deterrent effect should not be underestimated." 24
119.

130 U.S. 2811, 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring).

120.
121.

Brienza, supra note 87.
United States Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, Hearing on Eco-

Terrorism Specifically Examining Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 61-65,
Opening Statement of Senator Inhofe.
122. Brienza, supra note 87.
123. See supra note 61.
124. T.W. Farnam, The Influence Industry: Disclose Act could deter involvement in elections,
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There are many who believe that the NAACP no longer needs such
protection, and that politics today is so different that references to this and
other cases are misplaced. But as we have seen the NAACP has not been
the sole beneficiary of anonymity. And is it so far-fetched that in the next
few years we might see a series of bombings or drive-by shootings at the
homes of donors to Planned Parenthood or the National Organization for
Marriage? If so, we may regret it if we have too easily tossed away the
protection of political anonymity provided by the NAACP v. Alabama line
of cases.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have laid out some practical problems with efforts to get
"full disclosure" of political spending, problems that have received far too
little attention in the wake of Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission. It simply will not do-at least not for serious policy makers-to
demand "full disclosure" of "secret money" without considering the
practical realities of political participation and campaigning, and giving
careful consideration to what, really, would be gained by added disclosure
on top of the extensive compulsory disclosure regime that already exists.
We already have, after all, more campaign finance disclosure than at any
time in history prior to 2003.
Proposed laws such as DISCLOSE will neither provide the public with
good information, nor solve the alleged problems of "secret money."
Further, they will come at a price in political freedom and safety from
government and private retaliation. Precedents protecting civil liberties,
established over a half century of painstaking litigation, could be brushed
aside in the sudden hysteria for "full disclosure." Liberty, once lost, may
not be lost forever, but it certainly can be difficult to reclaim.1 25
Only by realizing and accepting the limits of disclosure can we develop
a truly optimal policy that makes the proper tradeoffs between individual
liberty, the public's desire to monitor officeholders, public information on
candidates and issues, and civic participation.

WASH. POST, May 13, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/12/
AR2010051205094.html (quoting Sen. Chuck Schumer).
125. See John Adams & Abigail Adams, FAMILIAR LETTERS OF JOHN ADAMS TO HIS WIFE,
ABIGAIL ADAMS 76 (Charles Francis Adams, ed. 1876) (Letter to Abigail Adams, July 17, 1775),
Available at http://books.google.com/books?id=fGZM4qiKHWkC&printsec=frontcover&source=
gbs-ge summary r&cad=O#v-onepage&q&f -false ("Liberty, once lost, is lost forever.").

